

DD/A Registry

83-4553

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Executive Registry
7E-12 Headquarters

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. DDA
7D024 Headquarters

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

DD/A REGISTRY

FILE: 10-1

DD/A Registry
83-4553

SECRET**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Polygraph--Its Future in the Federal Government

FROM: <input type="text"/>		EXTENSION	NO.
Director of Security 4E-60 Headquarters		<input type="text"/>	DATE 13 OCT 1983
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. DDA 7D-24 Headquarters			<p>Attached, for the signature of the DCI, is a proposed letter to Judge Clark on the subject of polygraph--its future in the Federal Government.</p> <p>The paper draws attention to: polygraph's importance to the CIA and NSA security programs; the logic of expanding its use to the SCI world generally; and finally, the significance of polygraph to NSDD-84.</p> <p>Recommend DCI signature.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 200px; margin: 10px auto;"></div> <p>Att</p> <p style="text-align: right;">OS 3 2512</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Regarded Unclassified when separated from Classified Attachment(s)</p>
2. Chairman, SECOM 7B-31 Headquarters			
3. C/ALD/OGC 7C-40 Headquarters			
4. DD/OLL 7D-43 Headquarters			
5. Executive Registry 7E-12 Headquarters			
6. Executive Director			
7. DDCI			
8. DCI			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

Washington, D.C. 20505

Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bill:

I am deeply troubled by the recent Congressional attention which has focused upon the use of the polygraph by the United States Government. Congressional interest in the "Carlucci Initiative," which expands the use of the polygraph within the Department of Defense, has become intertwined with Congressional concern about the use of the polygraph in unauthorized disclosure investigations as provided in NSDD-84. The result is that the Congress is now taking a close, skeptical look at the Government's use of the polygraph across the board and, unless we are careful, not only will additional use of this valuable security tool be rendered impossible, but the effectiveness of existing personnel security programs which utilize the polygraph may be jeopardized.

To help ensure that such an eventuality does not come to pass, it is my judgment that an Administration policy statement on the use of the polygraph by the Government should be developed. This will meet the concerns of many critics that the Government uses the polygraph on a haphazard, arbitrary, and capricious basis, pursuant to no reasoned policy or program. Such a polygraph policy should authorize use of the polygraph for three separate and distinct security purposes. In order of their importance to the national security, these purposes would be:

a. The use of the polygraph in the personnel security programs of CIA and NSA as an adjunct to security processing;

b. The use of the polygraph as a screening device for persons in the Executive Branch who are being processed for initial or continued access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI); and

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR

SECRET

c. The use of the polygraph in other appropriate contexts, such as in investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information.

With respect to the first category of polygraph use, the CIA and NSA polygraph programs have been in place for decades. They are essential components of the personnel security programs of both agencies and they are conducted by highly trained professionals. There has been no hint of abuse or any misuse of the polygraph by either CIA or NSA. Unlike the employees of other Government agencies, CIA and NSA employees come into contact with the most sensitive intelligence information on a daily basis. Only the most rigorous security standards can ensure the protection of such information. I'm sure you agree that CIA and NSA simply cannot afford to lose the added degree of protection provided by the carefully focused use of the polygraph in their personnel security programs.

The second category of polygraph use would represent a moderate, but significant expansion of polygraph use within the Government. I continue to believe that the security of intelligence sources and methods cannot be protected only at the producer end of the intelligence chain. The consumers of intelligence should be required to meet the most stringent security standards appropriate to their level of informational access. Those who are given access to the most sensitive intelligence information, SCI, ought to be subject to the most stringent security processing possible, which should include use of the polygraph as a screening device. Polygraph examinations conducted for this purpose would be limited to issues directly related to counterintelligence. This proposed use of the polygraph would serve two important security purposes. First, it would help identify any persons who have relationships with foreign intelligence services. Second, it would have a deterrent effect on persons granted SCI access and would ensure a greater sensitivity and care in the handling and safeguarding of such intelligence information.

The third category of polygraph use would provide authority to employ the polygraph in circumstances related to the protection of classified information, or in law enforcement matters, where such use would be desirable, as well as appropriate, but where case-by-case approval would be required. This category would include the use of the polygraph in investigating unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Although the establishment of this category of polygraph use would not represent a significant increase in polygraph use, numerically

speaking, this category is the most far-reaching in concept and is almost certain to generate the most controversy. However, some concerns of those critical to this approach could be alleviated by the clear understanding that unauthorized disclosure polygraph examinations would not be given in a blunderbuss way, but only when other investigations have narrowed the suspects to a manageable few. In addition, I would suggest that the Attorney General promulgate guidelines governing use of polygraph in appropriate law enforcement contexts.

If the Administration's polygraph statement is constructed along the lines I have outlined above, we will have gone a long way towards establishing a narrow, carefully tailored polygraph program for the Government which meets the needs of the Government to protect the most sensitive classified information, but in a reasonable and restrained fashion. However, I cannot emphasize enough the necessity of preserving the polygraph component of the personnel security programs of CIA and NSA, whether any expansion of polygraph use occurs or not. While it would be desirable to increase the use of the polygraph in the ways set forth above, we should take great care to ensure that use of the polygraph by CIA and NSA is neither restricted nor impaired as we proceed with this undertaking.

One final point should be noted. DOD representatives are scheduled to testify before the Brooks Committee on 19 October regarding DOD's plans for expanding the use of the polygraph. I understand that the Secretary of Defense has not decided whether he will continue to advocate expanded use of the polygraph or agree to abandon the "Carlucci Initiative." Since the support of DOD is essential if the use of the polygraph is to be expanded, it would be advisable for you to review this matter with the Secretary of Defense.

I look forward to hearing from you further regarding my proposal.

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

SECRET

**SUBJECT: Letter to the Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Re Polygraph--Its Future in the Federal Government**

CONCUR:

14 OCT 1983

25X1

Date

~~Deputy Director for Administration~~

14 OCT 1983

25X1

Date

~~Chairman, DCI Security Committee~~

25X1

10/14/83
Date

for ~~Chief, Administrative Law Division, OGC~~

25X1

14/10/83
Date

~~Deputy Director, Office of Legislative Liaison~~

25X1

10/17/83
Date

~~Executive Director~~

17 OCT 1983

25X1

Date

~~Deputy Director of Central Intelligence~~

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ExDir
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DDA
- 1 - C/SECOM
- 1 - C/ALD/OGC
- 1 - DD/OLL
- 1 - D/Sec

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. <i>20/00A</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	13 OCT 1983
2. <i>A00A</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	14 OCT 1983
3. <i>00A</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	14 OCT 1983
4.		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	For Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Propose Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See file
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

Do not use this form as a receipt for approvals, endorsements, dispatches, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No. — Bldg.
	Phone No.

5041-282

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-75)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.606

* GPO : 1981 O - 361-529 (148)

25X1